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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
On the other hand there are at least two North Carolina cases which
differ radically from the result reached by a strict application of the
doctrine. While it is true that in neither of these cases did the court
expressly consider thQ doctrine, the problem was present on the facts
and necessarily involved in the holding. In the case of Pettijohn v. Wil-
liams,12 the court, per Pearson, J., allowed a bill for rescission even
after judgment had been recovered in the action for deceit, double recov-
ery being prevented by an injunction against further proceedings in the
law action pending the proceedings for rescission. Also, in Troxler v.
Building Co.13 the court was little worried by the technical inconsistency
of the plaintiff's double-barreled request in the same complaint for dam-
ages for deceit and for rescission, even sending appropriate issues on
both counts to the jury, though, of course, a recovery would finally be
permitted on but one.
It is a commentary on the value of a strict application of the doc-
trine that the ultimate results obtained by these last two cases, in which
it was not applied, seem far preferable to the results of those cases in
which it was strictly applied. Furthermore, the problem which the
doctrine was originally invoked to meet, i.e., prevention of a double
satisfaction, was adequately met in these cases. Therefore, unless there
has been a decision adverse to the plaintiff in the first action on the ques-
tion of fraud, thus constituting res adjudicata,'4 or unless the bringing
of the first action has led to such a material change of position on the
part of the defendant as to constitute an estoppel,15 it would seem the
doctrine has little to recommend itself except mere compliance with
formal logic.
F. M. PARKER.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Declarations of
Present Bodily Feelings.
Plaintiff filed a claim before the North Carolina Industrial Com-
mission for compensation, contending that the death of her husband
resulted from an accident arising out of his employment by defendant
"Pettijohn v. Williams, 55 N. C. 302 (1855) (Although speaking of an
"election of remedies," the court is here considering an election between legal
and equitable remedies rather than an election between affirmance and disaffirmance
of a voidable transaction).
" Troxler v. Building Co., 137 N. C. 51, 49 S. E. 58 (1904). This case seems
to be contrary to the more recent case of Lykes v. Grove., 201 N. C. 254, 159 S. E.
360 (1931), cited note 9, supra.
" Gutheil v. Goodrich, 160 Ind. 92, 66 N. E. 446 (1903). In some jurisdictions
a prior suit to rescind is a final election only when it is res judicata on the
merits of the subsequent action in deceit. Kramer v. Association of Almond
Growers, 111 Cal. App. 595, 295 Pac. 873 (1931); Dooley v. Crabtree, 134 Iowa 465,
109 N. W. 889 (1907).
"Comment (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 665.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
drug store. Deceased, after carrying two heavy boxes into the store,
complained of a pain around his heart. Over plaintiff's objection,
defendant was allowed to have a physician testify that shortly after
the accident deceased told physician that he first felt the pain while
returning from the post office previous to the accident. Judgment for the
defendant was affirmed on appeal. The declaration was held com-
petent as one of "bodily feelings" and therefore not within the hearsay
rule.'
Generally declarations of present existing bodily feelings are ad-
missible as an exception to the hearsay rule on the theory that their
spontaneity makes them trustworthy.2 Some jurisdictions qualify this
exception by holding declarations even of present pain inadmissible
unless made to a physician. 3 In nearly all jurisdictions the declaration,
to fall within this exception, must be one of present existing pain.
Those which allow declarations of past pain do so in cases where the
declarant was under the influence of some exciting stimulus so strong
as to minimize the possibility of reflective falsehood. 4 This exception
for excited utterances, often comprehended under the omnibus term
"res gestae," is independent of the one under consideration and beyond
the scope of the present discussion.
In North Carolina such declarations must relate to present bodily
feelings. If this requirement is met, they are admissible whether made
to a physician or not.5 This includes cases involving declarations made
even to members of the declarant's family.6 It cannot be clearly ascer-
tained from the facts in many of the North Carolina cases whether the
declarations were of present or past bodily feelings. However, it is
explicitly stated in the opinions that the exception in question saves
'Moore v. Summers Drug Co., 206 N. C. 711, 175 S. E. 96 (1934).2 Biles v. Holmes, 33 N. C. 16 (1850) ; Perkins v. Concord R. R. Co., 44 N. H.
223 (1862) ; Thomas v. Herrall, 18 Ore. 546, 23 Pac. 497 (1890) ; 3 WIGmORE, Evi-
DEN E (2d ed. 1923) §1718 et seq.; 1 GR ENLgAJ, Evmimca (13th ed. 1876) §102.
'Reed v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 574 (1871) ; Roche v. Brooklyn City
& N. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 294, 11 N. E. 630 (1887) (The court said "But evidence
of simple declarations of a party, made sometime after the injury, and not to a
physician for the purpose of being attended to professionally, and simply making
the statement that he or she is then suffering pain . . . is liable- to gross exag-
geration and is evidence of a most dangerous tendency").
'Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Moseley, 75 U. S. 397, 19 L. ed. 437 (1869) ; 3
W GmoRE, EviDENcE (2d ed. 1923) §1745; Morgan, Suggested Classification of
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 229.
'Biles v. Holmes, 33 N. C. 16, 20 (1850) (The court said, "The declaration of
a patient to his physician is strong evidence of the state of his health and only
differs from his declaration to a third party because it is less probable that he
will feign or state falsehoods to one by whom he hopes to be relieved; but this
consideration only affects the degree of credit due to such declarations and does
not affect their admissibility.") Lush v. McDaniel, 35 N. C. 485 (1852) ; Howard
v. Wright, 173 N. C. 339, 91 S. E. 1032 (1917) ; Bryant v. Burs-Hammond Con-
struction Co., 197 N. C. 639, 150 S. E. 122 (1929).' State v. Harris, 63 N. C. 6 (1868).
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from the hearsay rule only declarations of present bodily feelings.7
Indeed some of them expressly exclude declarations of past pain."
Hence it would seem that the North Carolina cases clearly permit
declarations of present pain and exclude such evidence of past bodily
feelings.
The ruling of the instant case advances beyond precedent by receiv-
ing a declaration of past pain. It is conceivable that our court intends
only a slight modification of preexisting doctrine to the effect that
declarations of past pain may be received where they are made to a
physician for purposes of treatment. It is possible that the court in-
tends a total abandonment of its former limitations by receiving dec-
larations of past bodily feelings made to anyone. The language of the
court suggests a third interpretation, namely: that where the time be-
tween the pain and the declaration thereof is of short duration (prob-
ably an half hour or less in this case), it is still to be considered a
declaration of present pain. This interpretation is frustrated by the
obvious inconsistency of calling past pain present pain. In any event,
the court has not applied the well established rule borne out by a long
line of North Carolina cases.9
It is submitted, however, that the court in the principal case prop-
erly admitted the declaration, notwithstanding the consequent perplex-
ity of the law on the subject. The declaration, although of past pain,
was made to a physician for purposes of treatment and as such is a
satisfactory testimonial of its own trustworthiness. Such a declaration
meets the two requirements underlying recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule-that the declaration be necessary and trustworthy.10  It
may thus be hoped that the instant ruling lays the foundation for a new
exception to the hearsay .rule for statements made by patient to
physician. E. D. KUYKENDALL, JR.
Evidence-Testimon, of Interested Survivor in Accident
Litigation.
While a married couple were riding together, the car skidded from
a curve and turned over, the husband being killed and the wife injured.
The wife sued her husband's estate for injuries caused by his negli-
gence. C. S. 1795 provides that in an action against the administrator
'Bell v. Morrisett, 511 N. C. 178 (1858) ; Henderson v. Crouse, 52 N. C. 623
(1860); State v. Harris, 63 N. C. 0 (1868).
I Martin v. Hanes, 189 N. C. 644, 127 S. E. 688 (1925).
'Wallace v. McIntosh, 49 N. C. 434 (1857) ; State v. Harris, 63 N. C. 6 (1868)
Howard v. Wright, 173 N. C. 339, 91 S. E. 1032 (1917); Martin v. Hanes, 189
N. C. 644, 127 S. E. 688 (1925).
113 Wimooa, EvmzxcE (2d ed. 1923) §1718 et seq.
